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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-VOTING
REQxmENT

EIGHTS-STATE ENGLISH LrnRAcY

UPrHmm.-Mexican-American Federation-Washington

State v. Naff, 299 F. Supp. 587 (E.D. Wash. 1969).
The four individual plaintiffs, who were participating in a voter
registration project initiated by the plaintiff Federation,1 appeared
on separate occasions in the offices of the deputy voting registrars for
the towns of Zillah and Toppenish, Washington, intending to register
to vote. Each time, the applicants were accompanied by an interpreter
associated with the Federation, who informed the registration officers
that the applicants wished to register to vote and that he would act as
Spanish-English interpreter. But the registration officers insisted that
the applicants present their requests in person and in English, and
refused to register them when it became apparent that the plaintiffs
had not fully mastered the English language,2 although they were
otherwise fully qualified as to age and citizenship. The registration
officers acted pursuant to article VI, amendment 5, of the Washington
constitution, which requires that persons otherwise qualified be "able
to read and speak the English language" in order to vote in the state;
more specifically, their refusals seem to have been prompted by
R.C.W. § 29.07.070, which provides that:'
(h)aving administered the oath, the registration officer shall interrogate the applicant for registration ... requiring him to state:
• .. (w)hether the applicant ... is able to read and speak the
English language so as to comprehend the meaning of ordinary
English prose, and in case the registration officer is not satisfied
in that regard, he may require the applicant to read aloud and
explain the meaning of some ordinary English prose ....
Both the Federation and the individual plaintiffs brought suit against
the county registration authorities and the State, asking that enforce1. The Mexican-American Federation is a Washington Corporation. Its purposes
include to represent, promote, and achieve the economic, social, and cultural interests
of all Mexican-American people in the State of Washington.
Mexican-American Federation-Washington State v. Naff, 299 F. Supp. 587, 988 (E.D.

Wash. 1969), appeal docketed sub nom. Jiminez v. Naff, 38 U.S.L.W. 3390 (U.S. April

7, 1970) (No. 1367).
2. One plaintiff, Marta Cantu, "was unable to read the preliminary oath. Thereupon
(the registrar) asked her if she could read the names on the list of candidates which he
presented to her. She was unable to read the list and did testify that her ability to read
was limited to a few simple words in her children's school books ... ." 299 F. Supp. at
593.
3. WASH. Rav. CoDz § 29.07.070(13) (1969).
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ment of the Washington literacy requirement be enjoined as unconstitutional, that Spanish-speaking registrars be ordered appointed, and
that plaintiffs be permitted to register to vote. Plaintiffs contended,
inter alia, that the literacy requirement infringed upon their rights
under the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution, and that they had been given literacy tests violating the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.1 Held: the Mexican-American Federation
lacks standing to sue,5 and, in its application to the individual plain4. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1969) (Voting Rights Act of 1965), which
provides in pertinent part that:
No person acting under color of law shall . . . (C) employ any literacy test as a
qualification for voting in any election unless (i) such test is administered to each
individual and is conducted wholly in writing ....
42 U.S.C. § 1971(a) (2) (C) (i) (Supp. IV, 1969). The validity of this statute, and the
authority of Congress to suspend application of literacy tests under the accompanying
provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)-(d) (Supp. IV, 1969), were upheld in South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, (1966), on the basis of the language of the Supreme Court
in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), to the effect
that "a literacy test, fair on its face, may still be employed to perpetuate that discrimination which the Fifteenth Amendment was designed to uproot." 360 U.S. at 53, quoted in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 333.
Defendants in the principal case conceded that the Washington statute, WASH. REv.
CODE § 29.07.070(13) (1965), which permits the registrar to "require the applicant to
read aloud and explain the meaning of some ordinary English prose," was violative of
the above-quoted portion of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, as not ensuring objectivity in
application. Nevertheless, the District Court held that the request for injunction against
the application of this statute raised an issue which was rendered moot by opinions of
the Washington State Attorney General prohibiting further application of the test "until
such time as a universal test has been promulgated." 299 F. Supp. at 592.
In a rather cavalier treatment of the facts of the principal case, the court did not
consider the registrar's administration of a reading test to one of the plaintiffs (see note
2 supra) as evidence tending to prove that the unconstitutional statute was in fact being
applied, but instead held that this was merely "an isolated incident," not necessarily
indicating discriminatory practices. 299 F. Supp. at 593. The Court apparently relied on
the questionable assumption that discrimination cannot be proved by evidence of only
one incident.
The oral literacy test administered by the registration officers--asking the plaintiffs
...
can you speak and read English?"--was characterized by the court as "a simple
inquiry" which could not possibly result in discrimination, and was not the sort of test
which Congress intended to prohibit. 299 F. Supp. at 592. The Act defines "test or device"
as
' . any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting (1) demonstrate the
ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, [or] (2) demonstrate
any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject. ...
42 U.S.C. § 1973b (c) (Supp. IV, 1969). It seems inexcusable for the Court to have
ignored such language which plainly appears to govern the facts of this case.
5. The District Court noted that the Federation's claims were "of the same character"
as the claims of the American Civil Liberties Union in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939), in which the Supreme Court reasoned that a corporation, as an artificial person,
cannot possess or be deprived of civil rights, since civil rights are personal. But see
N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), in which the Supreme Court allowed the
plaintiff Association to assert its members' personal first amendment rights before the
Court. The fact that an artificial person cannot possess the rights asserted did not prevent
the Court from granting the Association standing.
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tiffs, the English literacy requirement is a valid exercise of state power
and is not being administered in a discriminatory manner. MexicanAmerican Federation-Washington State v. Naff, 299 F. Supp. 587
(E.D. Wash. 1969).
In upholding the constitutionality of the Washington literacy requirement, the District Court relied upon Lassiter v. Northampton
County Board of Elections,6 where the United States Supreme Court
upheld the constitutional validity of a North Carolina requirement
that applicants be able to read and write any section of the state constitution. The holding in Lassiter was grounded on two premises:
(1) that a state has broad powers in legislating voter qualifications,
limited only by constitutional prohibitions against discrimination,'
and (2) that a literacy requirement, since it might conceivably be
used for a legitimate state purpose, cannot be deemed an unjustified
infringement of the right to voteY The Supreme Court noted that
literacy does bear 9
some relation to standards designed to promote the intelligent use
of the ballot .... (I)n our society where newspapers, periodicals,
and other printed matter canvas and debate campaign issues, a
state might conclude that only those who are literate should
exercise the franchise.
Lassiter unequivocally held that a literacy requirement, in itself, is not
a violation of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendments' prohibitions
against discrimination. However, the Court excepted from its holding
those tests which are obviously nothing more than "device(s) to make
discrimination easy,"'0 and those instances in which a test "fair on its
2
face"" is in fact used to discriminate.'

6. 360 U.S. 45 (1959). See also Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).

7. 360 U.S. at 50-51. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV; amend. XV; art. I, § 2; amend. XVII.
See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 303 (1941): 'Voters in a primary election are
denied the equal protection of the laws by state officers who refuse to count their votes as
cast and count them in favor of an opposing candidate." See also Pope v. Williams, 193
U.S. 621 (1904) (States have broad powers to set residence requirements); Hall v. Beals,
396 U.S. 45 (1969) (post-election review of Colorado residency requirement for voting
in presidential elections barred by mootness).
8. 360 U.S. at 51-54.
9. Id. at 51-52.
10. Id. at 53.
11. Id. at 53.
12. Discrimination in the use of a test "fair on its face" was not alleged in Lassiter;
nor did the Court indicate how an objective test might be misused. Id. at 53.
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A literacy test can be so patently a tool for discrimination that it is,
prima facie, unconstitutional. In Davis v. Schnell, 3 an Alabama requirement that applicants "understand and explain" some part of the
Federal Constitution to the satisfaction of the voting registrar was
declared unconstitutional on the grounds that it gave the voting
registrar uncontrolled discretion to screen the electorate on the basis
of his own personal prejudices, as well as those of the white community in general. Since the test was subjective, there was no way of
reviewing disqualifications of "illiterate" blacks.
The Washington statute contains the same defect of subjectivity
found in Davis: if the registrar "is not satisfied ...

he may require the

applicant to read aloud and explain the meaning of some ordinary
English prose. ."I" The court in the principal case took note of this
defect,' 5 but, relying on two opinions of the Washington Attorney General directing that no literacy tests be administered in Washington
"until such time as a universal test has been promulgated,"' 6 the court
concluded that the issue of subjective discrimination should be deemed
moot, since there was no proof that the Attorney General's orders
were not being followed. Unfortunately, the court ignored the basic
thrust of plaintiff's argument-they were not simply attacking the
potential for discrimination under the Washington statute; they also
were challenging the application of any English literacy requirement
to Spanish-speaking citizens. Rather than merely posing a query as to
the applicability of Davis to the Washington facts, the plaintiffs also
questioned the validity of any reliance on Lassiter as the final word
concerning the validity of literacy requirements.
Indeed, more recent cases support the contention that the Lassiter
analysis is no longer controlling. In Harper v. Virginia State Board of
Elections,7 payment of a poll tax as a prerequisite to voting was held
unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment because "the Equal
Protection Clause ... restrains the states from fixing voter qualifica-

13. 81 F. Supp. 872 (D. Ala.) aff'd 336 U.S. 933 (1949) (per curiam). Accord,
Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.), aff'd 371 U.S. 37 (1962) (per
curiam); and Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
14. WASH. REV. CODE § 29.07.070(13) (1965). This provision is quoted in full in text
accompanying note 3 supra.
15. 299 F. Supp. at 591.
16. 299 F. Supp. at 592. See note 4 supra.
17. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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tions which invidiously discriminate."'-" The Lassiter Court asserted
that English literacy bears "some relation to standards designed to
promote the intelligent use of the ballot,"' 9 and the court in Harper
likewise focused on germaneness, reasoning that " (w)ealth, like race,
creed or color, is not germane to one's ability to participate intelligently
in the electoral process."2 0 But Harper went
further-quoting from
22
case:
apportionment
an
Sims,"
v.
Reynolds
Undoubtedly the right to suffrage is a fundamental matter in a
free and democratic society.... Especially since the right to exercise the franchise .. .is preservative of other basic civil and
political rights, any alleged infringement of the right to vote must
be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.
Lassiter proposed that a literacy requirement was justified if it might
conceivably be related to a legitimate state purpose; now Harper and
Reynolds23 require courts reviewing voting statutes to go beyond presumptions of constitutionality and simple speculation as to what a
"state might conclude" 2 4 and instead to devote "careful and meticulous
scrutiny" to the effect of the requirement on the right to vote.
Further, a 1969 Supreme Court case clearly demonstrates that
Lassiter's "rational basis" concept has been abandoned as a test of the
propriety of a state's voting requirements. In Kramer v. Union Free
School District,- a case involving voter qualifications for school district elections, the Supreme Court, again relying on the Reynolds
principle that the right to vote is the foundation of a representative
society, rejected both the presumption of constitutionally and the
"rational basis" test for determining the validity of statutory classifications. The Court held that the statutory denial of the franchise, to be
valid, must be "necessary to promote a compelling state interest" and
that, even when such an "interest" is shown, any limitation of the
18. Id. at 666.
19, 360 U.S. at 51. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
20. 383 U.S. at 668.
21. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). See also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1904),
22. 377 U.S. at $61-562 (emphasis added).
23. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, at 17-18 (1964), contains language very similar
to that quoted from Reynolds.
24. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. at 52. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
75, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). See also Cypriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969)
(per curiam).
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electorate must meet an extreme standard of precision and shall exclude no more than the "compelling state interest" demands.2 6 Thus,
Kramer appears to supersede Lassiter as regards the substantive standards against which voter qualifications must be judged. Neither
Lassiter nor the principal case concern themselves with the magnitude
of the interest to be protected or its corollary, precision of exclusion.
The Court in the principal case, relying on the teachings of Lassiter,
accepts the possibility that only those who are literate in English can
vote properly, in lieu of specific proof that Washington's English
literacy provisions do, in fact, preserve the purity of the ballot. While
"intelligent use of the ballot" may well be the sort of "compelling"
interest that Kramer requires, Kramer also requires a certainty, rather
than a possibility, that the continued existence of the literacy requirement is necessary to promote intelligent voting.
If there exist alternatives to an English literacy test which can adequately guarantee intelligent voting by non-English-speaking citizens
without excluding them from the polls, then literacy provisions can
hardly be considered necessary." In fact, such alternative methods are
available. Devices such as foreign language voter's pamphlets; translations of speeches and debates; foreign language newspapers, periodicals,
and broadcasts; voter education programs; and dual language ballots
either exist or, where appropriate, can be implemented at a cost to the
state which would be small in comparison to the harm which results
from denying citizens the exercise of a most basic right.
In addition, the precision with which literacy requirements guarantee
intelligent use of the franchise is questionable. Kramer, paralleling a
line of First Amendment cases, 28 requires that a voter qualification
exclude only those whose use of the ballot would be contrary to the
"compelling state interest." But a statute like the one involved in the

26. 395 U.S. 621, 627 et seq. (emphasis added).
27. Similar reasoning is found in a commerce clause case, Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951); and in a first amendment case, Shelton v. Tucker,

364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). A requirement to which there are more acceptable alternatives
(alternatives less likely to compromise a fundamental right) can hardly be considered
"necessary to promote a compelling state interest."
For a discussion of the alternatives available in the instant situation see the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Fortas concurring, in Cardona v. Power, 384
U.S. 672 (1966). See also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
28. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1966); United States v.
Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
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principal case, which operates to exclude all citizens whose English
language ability falls below an arbitrary level, denies the right to vote
to some citizens who are capable of voting at least as intelligently as
their English-speaking counterparts. The overbreadth involved becomes
especially apparent when one considers the ease with which the state
could have foreign language ballots printed and the effect which that
would have in enabling intelligent voting by Spanish-speaking citizens.
To exclude from the electorate persons who are able to vote intelligently, although they cannot pass a literacy test, is to deny a basic
right to some who present no threat to the interest the state seeks to
protect. To proceed on the assumption that English-speaking citizens
keep themselves informed and conversant concerning election issues,
but that non-English-speaking citizens (such as the plaintiffs in this
case, who were actively engaged in a voter registration project) do
not, is to rely on a fiction supported by little more than ethnic bigotry.
Under the recent decisions concerning reapportionment,2 9 states have
an affirmative duty to eliminate violations of equal protection which
are implicit in their voting systems. Given the facts of the principal
case, where a citizen's vote is not merely diluted but is completely
denied by an imprecise statute of doubtful justification, the state
should be under a similar affirmative duty to implement available
alternatives30 to insure intelligent use of the ballot, by means less
drastic than total exclusion of all citizens who are not fluent in the
majority language. Until such remedial measures are taken in Washington, the state will remain guilty of denying both the exercise of a
fundamental right and the means by which Spanish-speaking citizens
might become qualified to exercise that right.
In addition to Kramer's emphasis on the special value of the voting
right, which underlines the need for very close examination of state
actions which restrict the right, a different analysis, which shifts the
emphasis to discrimination in education, also presents a persuasive
challenge to the continued use of the Washington requirement.
In Gaston County v. United States3 ' the County sought to reinstate
a literacy test which had been suspended under the authority of the
29. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
30. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.

31. 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
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1965 Voting Rights Act3 2 on the ground that, during the five preceding
years, it had not been applied "for the purpose or with the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.""
Taking judicial notice of the fact that the County had for many years
maintained a segregated school system, which was itself a violation of
equal protection, the Supreme Court reasoned that it must also violate
equal protection for the state to deny black applicants the right to
vote due to their inability to pass a literacy test, since, no matter how
fairly the test might be administered, that inability was traceable to
the inferior education provided in the black schools.
The County, by administering a literacy test, gave effect to prior
discriminationand the situation would not have been corrected by the
most objective and fairly administered of tests.3 4 The Washington
provision is vulnerable on the same grounds. It seems likely that many
migrant workers who are now of voting age and residing in Washington
State were the victims of discrimination in the schools which they
attended, whether in Washington or in other (perhaps Southwestern)
states. Remedial programs for non-English-speaking students should
be an essential element of an educational system, yet such programs
are a fairly recent development. The norm seems to have been failure
to provide Latin American students with an effective education, something that the English-speaking majority takes for granted.3 5 Although
the probability of inferior education is a defect for which the state is
arguably responsible, the State of Washington denies Mexican-Americans the right to vote because this inferior education has not enabled
them to learn a second language. Thus, the state's use of a literacy
requirement perpetuates the effect of prior discrimination, as in the
Gaston County case.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(b), 1973b(a)-(d), 1973c (Supp. IV, 1969).
33. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. at 287 (1969). 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)
(Supp. IV, 1969).
34. Compare Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915): The effect of a Grandfather
Clause which exempts those registered before a certain date from the application of a
literacy test is to continue conditions which existed prior to the adoption of the fifteenth
amendment.
35. See generally: Sanchez, History, Culture, and Education, in LA RAzA: FORGOTTEN
ArmRIciANs 1 (J. Samora ed. 1966); Rowan, THE MExIcA, AMER CAN (paper prepared
for the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights-1968); WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE, JOINT
COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION, EDUCATION IN WASHINGTON 39 (Fifth Biennial Report1968); CONSULTING SERVICES CORPORATION, MIGRANT FARM WORKERS IN THE STATE OP
WASHINGTON, Vol. III, An Analysis of Migrant Agricultural Workers in Washington
State 14-16 (May 15, 1967); Vol. IV, Recommendations 9-13.
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If the state declines to take the necessary steps to assure that an
identifiable group of non-English-speaking citizens can cast an informed ballot, an effort to secure educational equality exemplifies an
alternate approach that the state could take to eliminate proscribed
impediments to access to the ballot box. Having undertaken to educate
school-age citizens to be intelligent electors, the state should be bound
to pursue that goal for all citizens. Until equality in educational opportunity is achieved, a literacy requirement will discriminate against an
identifiable group of non-English-speaking citizens.
Certainly the state cannot justify its literacy test on the ground that
it is necessary for intelligent use of the ballot, when it is imposed with
such heavy-handed overbreadth, and when the state itself declines to
implement alternatives to the present electoral and educational systems which would be much more rationally related to fulfillment of
the state's legitimate goal. Therefore, it seems clear that the State of
Washington did violate the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs by
imposing a literacy test without the identification of a compelling state
interest which cannot be served by alternative means, and by penalizing citizens for the effects of an educational system that seems to have
discriminated, either intentionally or unintentionally, on the basis of
ethnic background.
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